






























1. History of EU-Turkey Relations1 
1.1. Steadfast but conditioned Swedish support for Turkish EU membership 
The Swedish position towards Turkey has generally been positive. Sweden even supported 
TuƌkeǇ͛s full ŵeŵďeƌship oŶ the ĐoŶditioŶ that TuƌkeǇ fulfils the CopeŶhageŶ Đƌiteƌia, ǁith a 
special emphasis on democracy and human rights. The decision to grant the country candidate 
status in 1999 was therefore welcomed by the Swedish government. One of the arguments was 
that it would be easier to steer the country in a more democratic direction within the frame of 
the future negotiation talks. 
“ǁedeŶ͛s liďeƌal goǀeƌŶŵeŶt, which took office in 2006, focused on strengthening bilateral ties 
with Turkey and canalized its criticism mainly via the EU and the accession negotiation process. 
Therefore, Sweden was eventually perceived as oŶe of TuƌkeǇ͛s ďest fƌieŶds oŶ the EuƌopeaŶ 
ĐoŶtiŶeŶt. Moƌeoǀeƌ, the ƌeĐeŶt Ǉeaƌs͛ ĐleaƌlǇ authoƌitaƌiaŶ deǀelopŵeŶts in Turkey did not 
hinder the Swedish government – neither the centre-right coalition (2006-2014) nor the Social 
democratic-Green one (2014-) – from arguing that Sweden needs to engage even more in order 
to steer Turkey towards a complete fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria. To date, almost every 
“ǁedish foƌeigŶ ŵiŶisteƌ has deĐlaƌed suppoƌt foƌ TuƌkeǇ͛s ŵeŵďeƌship ďid iŶ theiƌ aŶŶual 
foreign policy declaration in the Swedish parliament. In fact, up until 2010 when the populist 
right-wing Sweden Democrats entered the parliament, there had been a consensus in the 
Swedish parliament in this regard.  
However, despite the current (2014-) Swedish government still supporting Turkey in its 
membership process, there seems to have been a serious setback in the Swedish-Turkish 
relations recently, which coincides with the more definite authoritarian development and a 
growing Euroscepticism in Ankara. Moreover, during the failed coup attempt in July 2016, the 
Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven told the “ǁedish ŵedia that he ǁas ͞ĐoŶĐeƌŶed͟ aďout 
the ͞seƌious situatioŶ iŶ TuƌkeǇ͟ aŶd added that the outĐoŵe of the oŶgoiŶg eǀeŶts is still 
͞uŶĐleaƌ͟, ǁithout immediately condemning the coup plotters. In the following month, Foreign 
Minister Margot Wallström criticized a Turkish legislative bill causing criticism from her Turkish 
ĐouŶteƌpaƌt ǁho said it ǁas a sĐaŶdal ͞to post suĐh a tǁeet ďased oŶ false Ŷeǁs oƌ speĐulatioŶ͟. 
This, along with the fact that the current Swedish government seems to use the EU less than 
their predecessors to canalize criticism, has probably contributed to the increasingly stalled 
relation. 
                                                          
1
 The EU 28 Country Reports were completed before the Turkish Constitutional Referendum on 16 April 2017. 
Thus, the report does not take account of any potential changes in the national debate that might have 
occurred in the meantime. 
  
 








1.2. Rights-based interest-oriented narrative dominating the debate 
Despite the fact that the Swedish position towards a Turkish EU membership has been positive, 
the narratives characterizing the Swedish stance have varied over time. Different arguments 
have been central to mark the Swedish support. The arguments applied have been connected to 
both the political colour of the Swedish government but also to the domestic political 
development in Turkey.  
By studying Swedish foreign ministers͛ foreign policy declarations, it becomes clear that an 
Europeanization perspective has consistently been adopted. The EU is often portrayed as the 
actor able to steer Turkey with regard to its process of democratization and enhancing the 
protection of human rights.  
The narrative of the EU as a potential change actor for its membership candidate countries, 
along with the clear focus on a rights-based conditionality, was initially shared among all parties 
in the parliament. It was not until the AKP came to power and initially carried out promising 
reforms that the Swedish government eventually also added value- and identity-based 
arguments, such as the then Social Democratic Prime Minister, Göran Persson (1996-2006), who 
in 2004 described Turkey as a bridge between a Christian Europe and a Middle East suffused by 
Islam. His successor, the liberal Fredrik Reinfeldt (2006-2014), often used a similar set of 
arguments until around 2011. It was in this period of time that Sweden was often referred to as 
͞TuƌkeǇ͛s ďest fƌieŶd iŶ Euƌope͟, shoǁiŶg that duƌiŶg tiŵes of Tuƌkish ƌeformism the Swedish 
government, regardless of political colour, were adding an identity-oriented narrative to the 
rights-based one.  
However, following the Turkish parliamentary elections in 2011 when the then Turkish Prime 
MiŶisteƌ ‘eĐep TaǇǇip EƌdoğaŶ ǁas elected for a third term, the identity-based arguments were 
reduced as the Turkish government became increasingly autocratic. The Swedish then liberal 
government returned to a stricter focus on value- and rights-based arguments, i.e. focusing on 
enlargement as the main driver to steer the country back into a reformistic agenda, focusing on 
democratization and strengthening human rights. Ever since, this has been the major line of 
argumentation of both the previous liberal government and the current social democratic one.  
The Swedish position towards Turkey has, however, also been characterized by pragmatism. 
When the Swedish parliament in 2010 adopted a resolution on recognizing the events in 1915 as 
genocide, Turkey immediately withdrew its ambassador to Sweden and a Turkish state visit to 
Sweden was cancelled, causing the then foreign minister Carl Bildt to openly regret the 
paƌliaŵeŶt͛s deĐisioŶ. Moƌeoǀeƌ, duƌiŶg the poliĐe ǀioleŶĐe toǁaƌds the Gezi paƌk 
demonstrators in Istanbul, Sweden remained remarkably silent. This constitutes just one 
eǆaŵple of the foƌŵeƌ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s stƌategǇ to ĐaŶalize its ĐƌitiĐisŵ ǀia the EU iŶ oƌdeƌ to 
maintain good bilateral relations with Turkey. 
  
 








1.3. Universal values in focus 
Sweden has a long tradition of defending universal ideals such as democracy and human rights in 
its foreign policy. The Swedish public opinion thus generally reacts when these ideals are 
infringed. The political Copenhagen criteria therefore constitute a recurring theme which, as 
shown above, has characterized the official Swedish position constantly over time. The limitation 
of freedom of expression, minority rights and the rule of law are consequently the main areas 
being discussed in Sweden as key factors to continuing the Turkish EU membership negotiations. 
2. Future of EU-Turkey Relations 
2.1. Both optimism and concern for the future 
CoŶsideƌiŶg the ƌeĐeŶt Ǉeaƌs͛ deǀelopŵeŶts, especially the period following the parliamentary 
elections in Turkey of June 2015, two main pictures are emerging. 
The first picture is shared among most politicians and public opinion-makers who express their 
increasing concern for democracy and the rule of law in Turkey, with a special emphasis on the 
highly limited freedom of expression in the country. The aborted peace process with the 
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the resumed fighting in several cities in the mainly Kurdish 
southeast, the increased number of terror attacks, the failed coup attempt and the 
consequences following it, all constitute factors worrying the Swedish political elite. Swedish 
representatives regularly express their deep concern for the political development in Turkey, 
however insisting that the EU is the best tool available to pilot Turkey in a more positive 
direction. Sweden thus maintains the conviction that increased commitment from the EU may 
eventually foster reform processes in central political areas such as the rule of law, democracy 
and human rights.  
The second picture, dominated by Swedish companies active in Turkey, thus constituting an 
͞eĐoŶoŵiĐ elite͟, iŶdeed ƌeĐogŶizes the pƌoďleŵs ideŶtified aďoǀe, ďut ǀoiĐes a ĐoŶsideƌaďlǇ 
more optimistic approach to operate in the country, both in the short and in the long term. 
Business Sweden, a partnership jointly owned by the Swedish government and the industry, 
conducted a survey presented during the fall of 2016 on how Swedish companies established in 
Turkey perceive the Turkish business climate. The apparent optimism seems to be driven by 
expectations on sector growth not least due to TuƌkeǇ͛s ǇouŶg populatioŶ aŶd Ǉet gƌoǁiŶg 
middle class. Albeit it is not possible to draw any far-reaching conclusions from this, the contrast 
between the political and economic elites is nevertheless striking. This example also suggests 
that the very same pragmatism apparent when looking at the “ǁedish positioŶ oŶ TuƌkeǇ͛s EU 
bid may also be relevant in this case. 
  
 








2.2. All or nothing in the Swedish debate 
Concepts of differentiated integration as an alternative to a full-scale membership are rarely 
presented in the Swedish debate. There are no significant differences among the majority of 
political parties being positive to a Turkish EU membership, albeit with a varying degree of 
enthusiasm. The main exception in this regard is the populist and EU-critical right-wing Sweden 
Democrats, currently the third largest party in the Swedish parliament, who explicitly urges the 
EU to cancel all forms of negotiations with the country. In light of the recent events in Turkey, 
the relatively small Leftist Party wants to freeze the membership negotiations and terminate the 
talks on visa freedom for Turkish citizens to the EU. In short, to a vast majority of Swedish 
political parties, the question is when, not if, or even how the EU should open its door for 
Turkey. 
The fact that Swedish actors, politicians as well as public opinion makers do not promote any 
foƌŵ of ͞pƌiǀileged paƌtŶeƌship͟ ŵaǇ ďe due to at least tǁo ƌeasoŶs. FiƌstlǇ, eŶlaƌgeŵeŶt is 
considered as an important tool to promote democracy and human rights, not least in the case 
of Turkey. Sweden has a long history of cooperating with Turkey, as it established diplomatic 
relations with the Ottoman Empire during the first half of the 18th century. Moreover, Sweden 
has a relatively large community of people with Turkish background, both due to labour and 
political migration. This possibly affects the Swedish position to a certain degree as well. 
Secondly, the Swedish engagement in the EU is characterized by a degree of pragmatism; 
Sweden is usually not that keen on deepened EU integration, standing outside the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) being the most obvious example, which indicates the Swedish cherry 
picking. Thus, it is likely that not as much of interest as it may be to other countries is at stake for 
Sweden in the case of a Turkish EU membership. 
2.3. Focus on EU role in the wake of the failed coup-attempt 
It was not as much the events in Sweden as those in Turkey that affected the characteristics of 
the debate on EU-Turkey relations in Sweden during the 2015/2016 period. The July 2016 failed 
military coup attempt and the consequences following it had a considerable impact on the 
characteristics of the debate on Turkey, not only by politicians but also public opinion-makers, 
researchers and various experts and analysts. The big demarcation line of the debate in Sweden 
regarding EU-Turkey relations ĐoŶĐeƌŶs the ƋuestioŶ of ǁhetheƌ the EU͛s ĐuƌƌeŶt eŶgageŵeŶt 
with Turkey should be put to an end or should rather be intensified. A number of actors have 
questioned whether or not Turkey could even be labelled as a democracy any longer. A small 
number of actors, however, argue that Sweden and the EU have let Turkey down considering the 
challenges it was facing particularly with the coup. Although neither the coup attempt nor the 
consequences following it prompted a change of the Swedish stance, the government stresses 












The ŵessage that ͞the EU Ŷeeds to do ŵoƌe͟ ǁas also ĐoŵŵoŶlǇ used ǁheŶ the fightiŶg 
between the Turkish military and the PKK was resumed during the fall of 2015, as well as when 
elected politicians from the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) were arrested in the wake of the 
coup attempt. The closure of numerous media outlets and the strong limitation on the freedom 
of expression – before as well as after the coup attempt – constitute additional examples 
causing demands on the EU to act. 
The fact that Sweden so often seeks to canalize its criticism towards Turkey via the EU may 
depeŶd oŶ a Ŷuŵďeƌ of ƌeasoŶs. Foƌ iŶstaŶĐe, the EU is “ǁedeŶ͛s ŵaiŶ foƌeigŶ poliĐǇ aƌeŶa as 
Sweden is neither a member of NATO nor of the G20, thus lacking other arenas to exert 
influence. Sweden has, however, a seat in the UN Security Council during the 2017/2018 period, 
but it remains to be seen whether Sweden would prefer that over the EU, considering the 
ongoing EU membership process. According to the ECFR scorecard survey from 2015, Sweden is, 
after Germany, the member state with greatest impact on the EU͛s foreign policy. 
3. EU-Turkey Relations and the Neighbourhood/Global scene 
3.1. Turkey’s role in Syria vital to Sweden and the EU 
The conflicts and the political changes in Turkey͛s neighbouring countries had a limited impact 
oŶ “ǁedeŶ͛s ǀieǁ oŶ TuƌkeǇ͛s ƌole iŶ the aƌea aŶd its ƌelatioŶs to the EU. It is ŵaiŶlǇ the 
doŵestiĐ ĐoŶfliĐts iŶ TuƌkeǇ that ĐoŶstitute “ǁedeŶ͛s ǀieǁ of the ĐouŶtƌǇ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the ĐoŶfliĐts 
in Syria and Iraq stand out as exceptions to this. 
Turkey joined the international coalition combating the terrorist group IS in 2014. However, it 
was not until the summer of 2015 that they made their air bases available for the coalition 
members to attack the IS, which caused frustration also within Sweden. Furthermore, the 
“ǁedish foƌeigŶ ŵiŶisteƌ ĐƌitiĐized that TuƌkeǇ͛s oǁŶ aiƌ stƌikes ǁeƌe Ŷot esseŶtiallǇ diƌeĐted 
towards the IS, but rather against the PKK. Sweden has repeatedly stated that this conflict 
between the Turkish government and the PKK can only be solved through negotiation and 
therefore Sweden pushes for peace talks both bilaterally as well as within the EU. The Swedish 
government believes that successful peace talks would have a positive impact also inside Syria. It 
also emphasized the important role of Turkey in the fight against IS, not least in the Operation 
Euphrates Shield, but stressed that it must not lead to strife with other groupings. It has often 
been pointed out that Turkey is a key player in the region as well as in the conflict in Syria. The 
Swedish government has outlined on several occasions the crucial importance of cooperating 
with Turkey in order to manage the challenges in the neighbourhood, which also include the 
refugee crisis that will be discussed below.  
  
 








3.2. Room for Swedish focus on rights in the refugee issue 
IŶ the light of the High ‘epƌeseŶtatiǀe FedeƌiĐa MogheƌiŶi͛s ƌeǀieǁ of the EuƌopeaŶ 
Neighďouƌhood PoliĐǇ ;ENPͿ iŶ ϮϬϭ5, the “ǁedish paƌliaŵeŶt͛s foƌeigŶ affaiƌs Đoŵŵittee 
presented a statement in December 2015, making three interesting additions. Firstly, the efforts 
promoting the priorities set out in the ENP (prosperity, stability and security) should be based on 
the universal values the EU cooperation stands on. Secondly, the regional dimension of the ENP, 
the partnerships, needs to be based on mutual commitments to the rule of law, good 
governance, respect for human rights including minority rights and the principles of market 
economy and sustainable economic growth. Thirdly, the committee emphasizes the importance 
of a clear membership perspective to those partner countries geographically located in Europe 
carrying out political and economic reforms. 
It can thus be concluded that representatives of Swedish foreign policy – be it the Foreign 
MiŶisteƌ oŶ TuƌkeǇ͛s EU ĐaŶdidaĐǇ oƌ the afoƌeŵeŶtioŶed Đoŵŵittee oŶ the ENP – attach 
importance to a similar rights-based narrative. One of the most important areas of cooperation 
between Sweden, via EU, and Turkey, which thereby crystallizes, is the handling of the refugee 
issue. One of the stated objectives was to limit the number of deaths in the Mediterranean and 
to limit the human traffickers. Instead, more than 5 000 people died on the Mediterranean in 
2016, to be compared with 3 771 in 2015, a direct consequence of refugees now trying to reach 
Europe via Libya, as Turkey now more efficiently prevents boats from departing. 
Tailored refugee deals with other Mediterranean countries aside, the numbers above show that 
the deal with Turkey does not offer a long-term solution. Awaiting an updated European asylum 
policy, Sweden could, either bilaterally or in larger constellations, work more proactively with 
Turkey in order to, for instance, help strengthen the capacity in the reception of the almost 3 
million refugees inside Turkey. Such work could perhaps serve as an example for similar efforts 
in other neighbouring countries.   
3.3. Refugee issue and Turkey-EU-deal in focus 
The refugee issue has become the most important political question for Swedish voters. In 2015, 
Sweden received 163 000 refugees, more per capita than any other country in the EU except 
Hungary. Turkey plays a key role in this matter considering the large number of refugees it is 
hosting and its refugee deal with the EU.  
This massive influx of refugees caused the Swedish minority government to establish border 
controls between Sweden and Denmark and over the Öresund Bridge connecting the countries. 
Furthermore, Sweden introduced temporary residence permits and a restricted possibility for 
family reunion. The rules, which took effect in early 2016, along with the EU͛s migration deal 
with Turkey resulted in that only 29 000 people sought asylum in Sweden in 2016. 
During the summer of 2015, it dawned on many in Sweden that the number of refugees 
suddenly increased. At a manifestation in solidarity with the refugees, the Prime Minister Stefan 
  
 








Löfven held a now disputed speech on the necessity of maintaining an open-border policy for 
the EU, only to decide on border controls and stricter asylum rules just a few months later. The 
Turkey-EU deal on refugees that was eventually agreed upon was also welcomed by the Swedish 
government. It argued that there would finally be an ending to the dangerous journeys over the 
Mediterranean, which undoubtedly shows the impact of global developments on the Swedish 
positioning regarding EU-Turkey relations.  
The appaƌeŶt shift iŶ Pƌiŵe MiŶisteƌ LöfǀeŶ͛s appƌoaĐh to the ƌefugee situation is not only the 
case for the government. In 2016, a similar shift – from a liberal approach to migration to a more 
rigorous one – could also be identified among several of the parties in the parliament. However, 
ǁhetheƌ the paƌties͛ ŵoƌe ƌestƌiĐted position on migration also reflects the opinion of the public 
has been questioned, and there are different studies finding contrarious conclusions. A recurrent 
theme of criticism directed towards the refugee deal is that Sweden and the EU allow 
themselves to be blackmailed by Turkey, while the Swedish government for its part maintains 
that the measures were necessary as the capacity of Swedish authorities had hit the ceiling. 
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